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ABSTRACT 
With the 14 members of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) having 
set the objective of adopting a common currency for the year 2018, an expanding 
empirical literature has emerged evaluating the benefits and costs of a common-currency 
area in Southern Africa. This paper reviews that literature, focusing on two categories of 
studies: (1) those that assume that a country’s characteristics are invariant to the adoption 
of a common currency; and, (2) those that assume that a monetary union alters an 
economy’s structure, resulting in trade creation and credibility gains. The literature review 
suggests that a relative-small group of countries, typically including South Africa, satisfies 
the criteria necessary for monetary unification. The literature also suggests that, in a 
monetary union comprised of all SADC countries and a regional central bank that sets 
monetary policy to reflect the average economic conditions (e.g., fiscal balances) in the 
region, the potential losses (i.e., higher inflation) from giving up an existing credible 
national central bank, a relevant consideration for South Africa, could outweigh any 
potential benefits of trade creation resulting from a common currency. 
Keywords: South African Development Community, monetary union, optimum currency 
areas. 
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  1.    Introduction 
The assessment of the benefits and costs of monetary union in Southern Africa has 
been a central focus of recent research on African economic integration. A substantial 
empirical literature evaluating the feasibility of adopting a common currency and a single 
central bank among countries in the southern region of Africa has emerged.
1 The purpose 
of this essay is to set-out what we know about the consequences of monetary unification 
and critically to review the expanding literature on the desirability and feasibility of 
monetary union in Southern Africa. 
The recent interest in assessing the consequences of monetary integration in 
Southern Africa stems from several factors. First, it is an outgrowth of a movement toward 
increased solidarity in Africa more generally (Cobham and Robson, 1994, p. 286; Masson 
and Pattillo, 2004, p. 10)
2. African monetary union is sometimes seen as a symbol of 
strength, and some of its proponents hope that it will help provide support for political 
integration.
3 One consequence of the formation of regional currency blocs in Africa, so the 
argument goes, is that they could culminate in a pan-African monetary union. Second, the 
experience of the European monetary union, which is perceived to have been beneficial 
for its members, has stimulated interest in monetary unions in regions outside Europe, 
including in Africa (Masson and Pattillo, 2005, p. 34; Jefferis, 2007, p. 83).
4 Third, 
monetary unification is often viewed as a way of perfecting a single market, especially for 
countries, such as those in Southern Africa, belonging to regional trading blocs (Kenen 
and Meade, 2008, p. 4). Fourth, recent academic work on the benefits and costs of single-
currency areas suggests that the adoption of a common currency can improve the 
structural characteristics of the economies concerned, increasing trade-integration and 
business-cycle correlation, and enhancing the credibility of macroeconomic policies 
(Frankel and Rose, 1998; Rose, 2000). The upshot of this recent literature is that the cost-
benefit calculus used to determine currency-area participation becomes more favorable 
                                                 
1 A literature dealing with the possibility of monetary unions in other parts of Africa has also emerged.  See, 
for example, Debrun, Masson, and Pattillo (2005) and Houssa (2007), who deal with monetary union in 
western Africa, and Benassy-Quere and Coupet (2005), who deal with monetary arrangements in the CFA 
Franc Zone. 
2 The African Union, a pan-African organization the Constitutive Act of which entered into force in 2001, 
set the goal of a single currency in Africa by the year 2021.  
3 Jefferis (2007, p. 93) noted that interest in an African monetary union reflects, in part, the view that the 
African Union “would be taken more seriously in global terms if it represented a more unified powerful 
economic bloc”. For a skeptical view of the connection between monetary union and political union in 
Africa, see Masson and Pattillo (2005, pp. 34-35). 
4 See Hochreiter and Tavlas (2007), and the articles contained therein, for discussions of regional currency 
blocs. 
  5after a country joins a currency union than before; therefore, the creation of a monetary 
union can itself create conditions that are favorable for the well-functioning of the union 
(De Grauwe, 2007, p. 27). 
The remainder of this paper is divided into four sections. Section 2 describes present 
exchange-rate arrangements of the economies in Southern Africa and briefly discusses key 
characteristics of these economies. Sections 3 and 4 discuss the traditional approach that 
has been used to assess the benefits and costs of a common currency and the endogenous 
approach dealing with currency-area participation, respectively. Under the traditional 
approach, economic structures are assumed to remain unaltered following entry into 
monetary union whereas, under the endogenous approach, economic structures are 
assumed to change following entry into monetary union. Section 3 begins with a 
discussion of some analytical aspects of monetary unions, including a presentation of the 
traditional criteria used to judge the appropriateness of a country’s participation in a 
monetary union. It then critically reviews the recent empirical literature on the benefits 
and costs of a common currency, in terms of the traditional criteria, in Southern Africa. 
Section 4 begins with a discussion of the recent analytic literature dealing with the 
endogeneity of economic structures following entry into a monetary union. It then reviews 
those studies that have dealt with this issue in the Southern-African context. Section 5 
concludes with a discussion of the implications of the recent literature for monetary unions 
among Southern African economies and the research tasks that remain to be addressed. 
 
2.    Present Arrangements: Basic Features 
The countries that have constituted the main area of focus of empirical work on 
monetary integration in Southern Africa are the 14 members of the Southern African 
Development Community (SADC), the combined population of which is about 245 
million people (Table 1).
5 Established in 1992, the SADC’s goal initially was to form a 
common market. Subsequently, the SADC included monetary integration as an objective 
and, at a meeting of its central-bank Governors in February 2005, proposed: (1) a 
monetary union, involving irrevocably fixed exchange rates among the participating 
                                                 
5 In recent years, there have been several changes in the composition of SADC membership. Seychelles had 
been a member but withdrew from the organization in 2004 while Madagascar joined in 2005. 
Consequently, some of the empirical studies reviewed below include Seychelles, but not Madagascar, in the 
sample of countries considered. As discussed below, some studies consider subgroups of SADC economies. 
  6currencies, coordination of monetary policies, and full capital-account convertibility, and 
(2) a common SADC currency and a regional SADC central bank for the year 2018. 
As shown in Table 1, the SADC members employ a variety of exchange-rate 
arrangements. A key feature of these arrangements is the Common Monetary Area 
(CMA). The CMA is a fixed-exchange-rate arrangement that groups four countries: South 
Africa, Lesotho, Namibia, and Swaziland.
6 The CMA originated as an informal 
arrangement during the colonial period in the early twentieth century. A currency union 
was formally established with the signing of the Rand Monetary Area Agreement (RMA) 
in 1974 by South Africa, Botswana, Namibia, and Swaziland, but Botswana withdrew in 
1975. That agreement was revised in April 1986 to establish the CMA of Lesotho, 
Swaziland and South Africa. Namibia, which became independent in 1990, joined the 
CMA in 1992. Under the terms of the CMA Agreement, Lesotho, Namibia, and Swaziland 
issue national currencies - - the loti (introduced in 1980), the Namibian dollar (introduced 
in 1993), and the lilangeni (introduced in 1974), respectively; those currencies have been 
pegged (at par) to the South African rand since their introduction. In addition, the rand is 
legal tender in each of the other three countries. However, none of the three currencies is 
legal tender in South Africa. Since the rand is legal tender in the other three countries, 
South Africa compensates each of the countries for forgone seigniorage.
7 With the other 
CMA currencies pegged against the rand, the South African monetary authorities follow a 
floating exchange-rate arrangement for the rand against other currencies. Monetary policy 
for the CMA countries is set by the South African Reserve Bank based on domestic (South 
African) objectives.
8  
Several other features of the CMA are important to mention. First, the CMA is not 
a full monetary union. As is the case in the euro area, each of the CMA countries has its 
own national central bank but, unlike the euro area, there is no common regional central 
bank to which the standard instruments of monetary policy have been consigned. Also, 
there is no pooling of reserves and no regional surveillance mechanism (Wang et al., 
2006, pp. 15-16). As noted above, monetary policy is set by the South African Reserve 
Bank, although the Governors of the four CMA central banks meet on a quarterly basis 
                                                 
6 The above description of the CMA is based on the discussions contained in Masson and Patillo (2005) and 
Wang, Masha, Shirono, and Harris (hereafter Wang et al.) (2006). 
7 Compensation is based on a formula equal to the product of (1) two-thirds on the annual yield of the most-
recently issued long-term South African government bond, and (2) the volume of rand estimated to be in 
circulation in the member country concerned.   
8 In February 2000, the Reserve Bank adopted a formal inflation-targeting framework. 
  7prior to the South African Reserve Bank’s Monetary Policy Committee meetings, at which 
interest rates for South Africa are set. Second, as pointed out by Wang et al. (2006), in 
some respects the CMA arrangement for Lesotho, Namibia, and Swaziland is similar to 
that of a currency-board arrangement - - domestic-currency issues are required to be fully 
backed by foreign-exchange reserves while monetary policy is set by the central bank of 
another (i.e., South Africa) country. In contrast to a currency board, however, there are no 
legal restrictions prohibiting the three smaller countries from acquiring domestic assets 
and there is no formal commitment to maintain exchange-rate parities with the South 
African rand. In principle, therefore, the authorities of Lesotho, Namibia, and Swaziland 
have the ability to conduct national monetary policies; in practice, however, it appears that 
the monetary policies of those three countries have closely tracked that of South Africa 
(Masson and Pattillo, 2005, pp. 65-73). In addition, unlike other formal exchange-rate 
systems’ arrangements, including that of the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM II) of the 
European Monetary System, there is no multilateral credit arrangement to provide support 
should an exchange-rate peg come under pressure. Third, as pointed out below, in recent 
years the CMA countries have run either budget surpluses or small deficits (in relation to 
GDP). Budgetary discipline among the CMA countries has been supported by (1) 
legislation that denies the CMA countries access to monetary financing by the South 
African Reserve Bank, (2) the South African Reserve Bank’s conservative policy stance, 
and (3) the requirement that Lesotho, Namibia, and Swaziland fully back issuance of 
national currencies with foreign-exchange reserves. 
Most of the other SADC countries have exchange-rate arrangements that are 
classified independently (i.e., freely) floating or managed floating (Table 1).
9 There are 
two exceptions - - Botswana, the currency (the pula) of which is pegged to a basket 
comprised (with unannounced weights) of the South African rand and the SDR, and 
Zimbabwe, which has a dual exchange-rate system and a non-convertible currency (the 
Zimbabwe dollar). Each of the SADC countries has (to varying degrees) controls on 
capital movements (Table 1). 
                                                 
9 Under free-floating rates, there is no commitment to a specific exchange-rate target. Supply and demand in 
the market determine the exchange rate. The authorities do not intervene in the foreign-exchange market and 
do not set interest rates for the purpose of affecting the level or path of the exchange rate. Under managed 
floating, although there is no specific exchange-rate target, the authorities may intervene in the foreign-
exchange market and/or set interest rates to influence the exchange rate (Tavlas, 2003). Classifications are 
based on the IMF’s Exchange-Rate Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions. 
  8Selected macroeconomic indicators of the SADC economies are presented in Table 
2, and trade indicators are presented in Tables 3 and 4. These indicators merit several 
comments. First, SADC economies differ markedly in size and structure (Table 2). South 
Africa, by far the largest economy (accounting for about 67 per cent of total SADC GDP 
and around 95 per cent of CMA GDP), is relatively industrialized and diversified while 
most of the other economies are small and undiversified, with dependence on a narrow 
range of commodity exports (Table 3). Second, the composition of exports varies 
considerably among the countries, and the prices of these exports frequently do not move 
closely together (Masson and Pattillo, 2005, p. 37). As reported in Table 3, the share of 
total exports comprised by the three major export commodities of the SADC countries is 
typically in the range of 70 to 90 per cent. Third, as is the case with African economies 
more generally, SADC countries tend to report very low shares of intra-regional trade; 
intra-SADC exports are typically less than 40 per cent of each country’s total exports 
(Table 4).
10 Factors contributing to the low shares of intra-SADC trade include the 
following: (i) low per capita income levels, resulting in internal markets of limited sizes; 
(ii) the concentration of most countries on primary-commodity exports; (iii) limited 
transportation facilities and large distances between population centers; and, (iv) 
relatively-high shares of informal trade because of permeable borders (Boughton, 1993; 
Cobham and Robson, 1994; Masson and Pattillo, 2005). As reported in Table 4, the intra-
trade (i.e., export) shares among SADC countries are considerably below the 
corresponding shares among euro-area countries; the latter shares are generally in the 
range of 50 per cent to 70 per cent. Fourth, although intra-trade among SADC countries is 
relatively small, an exception to this general pattern concerns bilateral trade between 
South Africa and its SADC partners (Table 4). Many SADC countries, particularly those 
in the CMA, have large shares of both exports and imports with South Africa. Thus, intra-
trade shares excluding South Africa are below 12 per cent for each of the countries 
reported in Table 4. Fifth, most of South Africa’s exports and imports are with non-
African countries; as reported in Table 4, South Africa’s exports to other SADC countries 
comprise less than 10 per cent of South Africa’s total exports. 
As mentioned above, the SADC has set a goal for the adoption of a common 
currency for the year 2018. In this regard, the central-bank Governors of that organization 
laid down a strategy for monetary union similar to the approach adopted by the European 
                                                 
10 The low levels of intra-regional trade contrast with the relatively-high levels (generally, over 40 per cent) 
that exist among euro-area countries (Table 4, Addendum item). 
  9monetary union. The latter approach is based on two principles (De Grauwe, 2007, p. 
143). First, the transition towards monetary union should be gradual one, extending over 
many years. Specifically, at their meeting in Tanzania in 2007, SADC Governors 
proposed the following framework for SADC integration: (1) free-trade area (absence of 
tariffs on intra-SADC trade) by 2008; (2) customs union (common tariffs on imports from 
non-members by 2010; (3) common market (customs union with free movements of the 
factors of production) by 2015; (4) (incomplete) monetary union (irrevocably fixed 
exchange rates and coordination of monetary policies) by 2016; and (5) a single currency 
and a regional central bank by 2018 (i.e., full monetary union) (SADC Central Bank 
Governors, 2007).  
Second, entry into the monetary union should be conditional on satisfying 
convergence criteria. In the case of the proposed SADC monetary union, the SADC 
central bank Governors established the following (interim) convergence criteria pertaining 
to the years 2004-2008: 
11 (1) single digit inflation rate by 2008; (2) fiscal deficit-to-GDP 
ratio below 5 per cent by 2008; (3) public debt-to-GDP ratio below 60 per cent (no 
specific year stipulated); (4) current-account deficit-to-GDP ratio not greater than 9 per 
cent (no specific year stipulated); and (5) real GDP growth rate of not less than 7 per cent 
(no specific year stipulated).  
Each country’s outcomes with respect to these convergence criteria are reported in 
Table 5. As shown in the table, seven countries did not achieve the inflation target in 
2006: Angola, Botswana, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Madagascar, Malawi, 
Mozambique, and Zimbabwe. Inflation in the latter country was over 1,200 per cent in 
2006 and accelerated to more than 7,900 per cent in the year to September 2007 (Central 
Statistical Office, Zimbabwe, 2007). Four countries (Madagascar, Mauritius, Tanzania, 
and Zimbabwe) did not comply with the fiscal criterion in 2006. Twelve countries - - the 
exceptions being the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and Zimbabwe - - 
complied with the public debt criterion, with five countries (Madagascar, Malawi, 
Mozambique, Tanzania, and Zambia) benefiting from debt relief under the HIPC 
initiative. Reflecting, in part, the budgetary discipline produced by the CMA arrangement, 
each of the four CMA countries satisfied both the fiscal and debt criteria in 2005 and 
2006. Three countries (Malawi, Mauritius, and Tanzania) did not achieve the current-
                                                 
11 Committee of Central Bank Governors of SADC (June 2007). The convergence criteria can be subject to 
relatively-large year-to-year fluctuations, so that success in satisfying the criteria in any particular year does 
not guarantee that they will be satisfied in subsequent years. 
  10account criterion in 2006. Three countries (Angola, Malawi, and Mozambique) attained 
the 7 per cent growth target. In sum, there was considerable diversity among the SADC 
countries in terms of the satisfaction of the (interim) convergence criteria thought 
necessary (by the Governors of the SADC central banks) to achieve regional monetary 
integration; some countries, the case of Zimbabwe being a prominent example, appear to 
be many years away from satisfying the convergence criteria. 
Two other aspects of the above convergence criteria deserve to be mentioned. 
First, the specific fiscal criteria appear to have been influenced by the Maastricht criteria 
used to assess a country’s suitability for entry into the euro area. The Maastricht fiscal 
criteria are as follows: (1) a fiscal deficit-to-GDP ratio not higher than three per cent, and 
(2) a public debt-to-GDP ratio of not more than sixty per cent or less.
12 As noted above, 
the SADC’s (interim) fiscal deficit criterion calls for a deficit-to-GDP ratio below five per 
cent, while the (interim) public debt-to-GDP criterion stipulates a ratio below sixty per 
cent of GDP, both of which are close to their Maastricht counterparts. Second, as is the 
case with the Maastricht criteria, the SADC convergence criteria are strictly nominal in 
nature. Nevertheless, the European Commission and the European Central Bank have 
pressed prospective entrants to the euro area to achieve a degree of real convergence prior 
to entry into the European monetary union (Buiter, 2008, p. 35). Underlying the concern 
placed on real (in addition to nominal) convergence is the view that countries that are at a 
relatively early stage of economic development could face the following situation upon 
entry into a monetary union: (i) relatively-high expected rates-of-return on investment; (ii) 
low real (and nominal) interest rates (because of the low area-wide inflation rate 
maintained by the regional central bank); (iii) with the free movement of capital, the first 
two factors can lead to  overly-optimistic income expectations and a “wrong” incentive  
structure of investment (i.e., investment in high-risk projects that would not have been 
undertaken in the absence of low interest rates), resulting in an overheating economy and a 
loss of competitiveness; and (iv) in the light of the above, the economy concerned may 
eventually be faced with the need to undergo a prolonged deflation to regain 
                                                 
12 The Maastricht Treaty provides exceptions to these two criteria. For example, a country can join the euro 
area if its public debt-to-GDP ratio exceeds 60 per cent but is approaching the 60 per cent reference value at 
a satisfactory pace (see De Grauwe, 2007). Another prospective monetary union that has established 
convergence criteria that appear to have been influenced by the Maastricht criteria is the Gulf Cooperation 
Council (GCC) (Buiter, 2008). The six countries comprising the GCC have set a goal of establishing a 
monetary union in the year 2010.  
  11competitiveness (Kröger and Redonnet, 2001). The issue of the role of real convergence 
appears not to have been considered to date in discussions of an SADC monetary union.
13
The above convergence criteria deal with the short-term economic performances of 
the countries concerned. Whether the SADC countries would benefit from a common 
currency requires analysis of structural characteristics of those countries, an analysis to 
which we now turn. 
 
3. Benefits and Costs of Monetary Union in Southern Africa: Traditional 
Approach 
3.1    Analytical Considerations 
In seeking to determine whether members of the SADC would benefit, on net, from 
adopting a common currency, most of the recent empirical literature on this issue has 
focused on the capacity of the countries concerned to satisfy optimum-currency-area 
(OCA) criteria. An OCA can be thought of as an “optimum” geographic domain in which 
a group of countries either shares a common currency or maintains separate national 
currencies with permanently fixed exchange rates among these currencies and full 
convertibility of the respective currencies into one another. Optimality is typically judged 
on the basis of the ability of the members of the currency area to maintain external 
equilibrium without domestic unemployment but with domestic price stability (Mundell, 
1961).
14  
The concept of an OCA was formulated in the context of the debate over the relative 
merits of flexible and fixed exchange rates. Early writers sought to identify the 
characteristics that an economy should possess ex ante in order to be a suitable candidate 
for participation in an OCA. Friedman (1953) observed that an economy afflicted with 
wage and price rigidities should adopt flexible exchange rates in order to maintain both 
internal and external balance. Subsequently, Mundell (1961), in originating the concept of 
                                                 
13 The study by Masson and Pattillo (2005) is an exception. Masson and Pattillo evaluated whether regional 
African country groups, including the CMA, form “convergence clubs”, which the authors defined as a 
decrease in the dispersion of real per-capita income levels over time in the countries concerned. The authors 
found strong evidence of convergence among CMA countries during the period 1975-99. 
14 For reviews of the OCA literature, see Tavlas (1993) and De Grauwe and Mongelli (2005). Dellas and 
Tavlas (2005) assessed the effects of asymmetries in the degree of labour mobility among the members of a 
monetary union. They found that, in terms of the benefits of monetary union, asymmetries among economies 
matter. Economies with relatively flexible wages lose (in terms of macroeconomic volatility and welfare) 
when they join a monetary union with economies with relatively rigid wages. 
  12an OCA, argued that factor (especially labour) mobility is a partial substitute for wage-
price flexibility since such mobility can moderate the pressure to alter real factor prices in 
response to disturbances affecting demand and supply.
15 Mundell also noted that 
economies subjected to similar terms-of-trade shocks are more-suitable candidates for an 
OCA than economies that are prone to asymmetric shocks since, in the former case, the 
similarity of the shocks negates the need for exchange-rate adjustment between (or 
among) the economies and permits implementation of a common monetary policy. Other 
important contributions to the earlier literature included (1) Ingram’s (1962) thesis that 
financial integration can cushion temporary adverse disturbances by encouraging capital 
inflows, reduce differences in long-term interest rates, and foster a more-efficient 
allocation of resources, (2) McKinnon’s (1963) argument that, everything else equal, 
relatively-open economies are better candidates for monetary unions than are relatively-
closed economies since, in the former, exchange-rate changes are not likely to have 
significant effects on competitiveness, and, (3) Kenen’s (1969) thesis that more-
diversified economies are better candidates for OCA membership than less-diversified 
economies since the diversification provides some insulation against a variety of shocks, 
forestalling the necessity of frequent changes in the terms-of-trade via the exchange rate. 
In the traditional OCA literature, the main benefits of monetary union derive from 
the elimination of the transaction costs of exchanging currencies and the elimination of 
exchange-rate volatility, the latter of which is thought to decrease cross-border trade and 
investment (Robson, 1987, p. 140; Tavlas, 1993). Additionally, the adoption of a single 
currency eliminates the need of firms to maintain staff to look after exchange rates within 
the area. As noted above, however, the countries in Southern Africa have very low shares 
of intra-area trade, so that the reduced transactions costs are not likely to provide large 
efficiency gains. 
Economies of scale to be derived from the move to monetary integration include 
those associated with: the enlargement of the foreign-exchange market, decreasing both 
the volatility of prices and the ability of speculators to influence prices and, thus, to 
disrupt the conduct of monetary policy; the elimination of the need of reserves for intra-
area transactions and, to the extent that exchange-rate parities are truly immutable, the 
elimination of the need of reserves to offset the effects of speculative capital flows within 
the area; the possible economizing of reserves since, if members are structurally diverse, 
                                                 
15 Labour mobility is a partial substitute because such mobility is usually low in the short run. 
  13any payments imbalances may be offsetting; and, the improved allocational efficiency of 
financing to the extent that it provides both borrowers and lenders with a broader spectrum 
of financial instruments, enabling borrowers, lenders, and equity investors to make more-
efficient choices in terms of duration and risk (Robson, 1987, p. 140; Tavlas, 1994). In the 
case of a Southern African monetary union, an added benefit could be that such a 
monetary union would provide smaller countries with a convertible currency. 
  The main costs of monetary union are those attributable to the inability of the 
authorities of the individual countries to use country-specific monetary policies and to use 
the exchange rate as an instrument of macroeconomic adjustment. The gains and losses 
arising from the establishment of monetary union are dependent on the structural 
characteristics of the economies concerned. For example, ceteris paribus, if a group of 
countries is very open to intra-group trade, the net gains derived from a common currency 
will be greater than it will be if the economies possess large non-traded goods sectors 
and/or strong trade links with countries outside the group. 
Empirical researchers dealing with common-currency-area formation face the 
problem that there is no single, overriding criterion that can be used to judge the 
desirability and/or viability of a monetary union. Moreover, researchers working on 
African regions are confronted with the problem that reliable data on the key OCA 
criteria, such as the degree of labour mobility among countries and the degrees of financial 
integration and of wage and price flexibility, are often difficult to obtain. With regard to 
financial market integration, common measures of such integration include covered and 
uncovered interest rate parities and saving-investment correlations. In the case of African 
economies, the data necessary to construct measures of financial integration are often not 
available. For example, measurement of covered and uncovered interest rate parities 
depend on interest rates in the countries concerned, but reliable interest-rate series for 
many African economies often do not exist over long time periods.
16 With regard to labour 
mobility in Africa, Boughton (1993, p. 277) noted that, although such mobility in Africa 
appears to be circumscribed by that large distances between population centers and a 
limited availability of transportation, there has nevertheless been a long history of intra-
regional migration of labour. However, apart from Wang et al. (2006), who provided data 
on the number of migrants from Lesotho, Namibia, and Swaziland during 1950-2005, and 
                                                 
16 Wang et al. (2006) are an exception to the observation that the lack of available data has hindered the 
study of financial integration among African countries; those authors found high degrees of co-movements 
in short-term interest rates during 1990-2005 among the CMEA countries. 
  14Houssa (2008), who provided data showing that there has been considerable labour 
migration among Western African countries, there has been little in the way of 
assessments of factor mobility among African economies. 
In the light of the absence of adequate data on financial-market variables, labour 
mobility, and/or wage/price flexibility, much of the empirical literature on regional 
monetary unions in Africa dealing with the traditional criteria (which assumes that a 
country’s structural characteristics remain unaltered following entry into monetary union) 
has focused on three areas: (1) analysis of the nature of shocks affecting the economies 
considered; (2) assessment of the degree of correlations of movements of real exchange 
rates and/or the terms-of-trade among the economies; and, (3) analysis of co-movements 
in cyclical real growth rates among the economies. A reason for focusing on each of these 
three areas is the presumption that countries facing a high degree of symmetry of shocks 
and/or high correlations of cyclical movements of real output and/or real exchange-rates 
do not need country-specific monetary and exchange-rate policies. An additional rationale 
for studying shock-absorption and movements in exchange-rates is that each is thought to 
combine the net influences of several of the criteria (Vaubel, 1978; Masson and Taylor, 
1992).  
3.2   Empirical Approaches 
In what follows, the empirical methodologies of 11 studies dealing with monetary 
unification in Southern Africa are considered, and the main thrust of the empirical results 
is presented and analyzed. A summary of the basic components and the main findings of 
recent studies is provided in Table 6.
17 Studies differ in terms of empirical methodologies 
used, countries considered, dependent and conditioning variables (in regression studies), 
and sample periods, so that the results of the studies are not strictly comparable. Some 
authors of studies reporting correlation coefficients provide significance levels while other 
                                                 
17 Table 6 provides information on 15 studies as follows. (1) Authors of ten of the studies (discussed in this 
section) dealt with only the traditional OCA criteria (i.e., they assume that a country’s characteristics remain 
unaltered following entry into monetary union). (2) Authors of three studies dealt with only the newer 
endogenous OCA thesis (discussed in the next section). (3) The co-authors of one study deal with both 
approaches. (4) Finally, a study by Jenkins and Thomas (1997) assesses the degree of economic convergence 
among 12 SADC countries, under the (plausible) presumption that real economic convergence is a necessary 
for coordination of exchange-rate policy. As the focus of those authors differs from the other studies 
discussed in this paper, their results are discussed here. The authors found no evidence of convergence of per 
capita income of the 12 countries considered over the period 1960-90. An implication of this finding is that 
the 12 countries considered are not ready for monetary integration. Jenkins and Thomas (1997) also found, 
however, that there has been marked convergence among Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, South Africa, and 
Swaziland, indicating that those five countries could form a monetary union. 
  15authors do not. Interpretation of the results of the studies is made more difficult because 
some authors use more than a single empirical methodology, with sometimes conflicting 
results. Moreover, authors of some studies focus on SADC countries or subgroups of the 
SADC, while other authors consider SADC countries within a broader context of African 
economies. A recurrent problem running through the literature is that authors tend not to 
compare their findings with those of other studies, making it difficult to place particular 
results in a broader context. To help identify the main dividing lines running through the 
literature, the studies discussed below are grouped into four broad methodological 
approaches (with some studies using more than one approach): (1) studies that deal with 
correlations of real growth rates (two studies); (2) studies that consider correlations of 
shocks (five studies); (3) studies that consider correlations of exchange rates / terms-of-
trade (five studies) and/or casual inspection of data (two studies); and (4) a (single) study 
that considers the degree of trade integration using a dynamic game set up. In the cases of 
those authors who also consider countries in other regions of Africa, the following 
discussion focuses only on the results that pertain to monetary union in Southern Africa. 
1.  Correlations of output growth rates. Studies that report correlations of real per-
capita growth rates aim to provide information on underlying shocks, the idea being that, 
apart from the impact of trend, movements in output are driven mainly by shocks. That is, 
studies in this genre assume that cyclical movements in output are primary the result of 
shocks. An initial attempt to measure correlations of per-capita output growth was made 
by Bayoumi and Ostry (1997); these authors calculated bilateral correlations of growth 
rates for 11 Southern-African economies over the period 1963-89. In a similar vein, 
Karras (2007) calculated correlations of de-trended output growth of nine SADC countries 
using real GDP based on purchasing-power-parity real exchange rates, as provided in 
Heston, Summers and Aden (2001), over the periods 1960-2000 and 1980-2000. Karras 
used three methods to estimate the cyclical component of output: (1) first differencing, (2) 
the Hodrick-Prescott (HP) filter, and (3) the Band-pass (BP) filter; each of these 
techniques is a way of removing the trend from a time series. Unlike Bayoumi and Ostry, 
who calculated bilateral output correlations among country pairs, Karras estimated 
correlations of each country’s cyclical output component (as estimated under each filtering 
technique) against the SADC total. A limitation of both the Bayoumi-Ostry and the Karras 
approaches is that the techniques used by the authors do not make a distinction between 
  16disturbances to output growth and the policy responses to the disturbances.
18 In other 
words, the approaches may not fully capture the impact of shocks since part of the time 
profile of de-trended growth is likely to reflect the policy responses of the authorities. 
Additionally, the approach does not account for the circumstance that an identical shock 
may affect individual nations differently, reflecting differences in initial positions and 
differences in behavioral parameters about fundamental matters such as wage and price 
flexibility, tax structure, and trade responsiveness (Mélitz, 1991, p. 321; Tobin, 1993). 
2.  Correlations of output shocks. In order to deal with the foregoing limitation, 
some authors used econometric methods in order to extract (i.e., separate) the underlying 
disturbances from real output. Bayoumi and Ostry (1997), Yehoue (2005), and Wang et al. 
(2006) employed a three-step autoregressive estimation procedure.
19 In the first step, the 
growth of per capita GDP was regressed on its own first and second lags.
20 In the second 
step, the underlying disturbances were calculated using the regression residuals (or a 
measure of the residuals, such as the standard deviation of the residuals). In the third step, 
authors obtained correlations of the disturbances among the countries considered. 
Bayoumi and Ostry estimated correlations of output shocks for 11 countries over the 
period 1963-89. Yehoue obtained correlations for 15 countries over the period 1980-2000. 
Wang et al. estimated correlations for five countries over the period 1980-2005. 
While the foregoing autoregressive approach helps separate the underlying shocks 
from the data, it does not identify separate demand and supply shocks. To address this 
problem, Buigut (2006) and Buigut and Valev (2006) used a two-step statistical 
methodology developed by Blanchard and Quah (1989) to extract underlying demand and 
supply shocks from GDP data.
21 In the first step, the authors estimated vector 
autoregressions using the variables of interest. In the second step, these authors identified 
demand and supply shocks by assuming that demand shocks were temporary while the 
supply shocks were permanent. They extracted demand and supply shocks for all the 
prospective members of the monetary union and computed the correlations of the demand 
                                                 
18 This limitation was recognised by Bayoumi and Ostry (1997), who also considered correlations of shocks. 
19 In fact, Wang et al. (2006) employed a four-step procedure. The first step involved testing for unit roots in 
the log of per capita GDP. The authors could not reject the hypothesis that the log of per capita GDP was 
integrated of order one for each of the countries considered. The remaining steps were as described above.   
20 As discussed below, Yehoue (2005) estimated a second-order autoregressive model of real output in levels 
instead of growth rates. 
21 The above description of the Blanchard-Quah methodology is based on that contained in De Grauwe 
(2007). The application of the Blanchard-Quah methodology to assess the suitability of countries for 
monetary union was first made by Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1993). Those authors assessed the suitability 
of European countries for monetary union. 
  17and supply shocks, respectively. The idea underlying the exercise is that asymmetric 
supply shocks are likely to continue after monetary unification (since such shocks have a 
structural character) while asymmetric demand shocks are likely to diminish (since they 
are partly policy induced). That is, since a monetary union involves a single monetary 
policy among the members, asymmetric demand shocks among members arising from 
differences in national monetary policies will be eliminated in a monetary union. 
Countries that are confronted with relatively-large asymmetric supply shocks are not likely 
to be good candidates for monetary union. 
It is worth pointing out that the Blanchard-Quah technique involves significant 
limitations. The technique relies on the idea that any difference-stationery variable can be 
decomposed into permanent and stationary components. In order to implement the 
technique, at least one of the variables must be nonstationery since stationery variables do 
not have a permanent component. The limitations of the technique include the following: 
(1) it relies on a vector autoregressive (VAR) set-up, which restricts any relationship 
among variables to be a linear relationship; (2) it essentially implies that there are only 
two kinds of shocks in the economy - - a supply shock that is assumed to be permanent 
and a demand shock that is assumed to be temporary, and (3) it assumes that the 
relationships among variables are constant with respect to time. In the real world, 
relationships among variables are likely to be nonlinear. Also, there are many kinds of 
shocks that hit an economy and it is unrealistic to assume that a demand shock is 
temporary while a supply shock is permanent. For example, a demand shock may involve 
hysteresis elements, so that the effect is long-lasting. Finally, relationships among 
variables are likely to be time-varying so that the coefficients are not constant over time.
 22
Buigut and Valev (2006) applied the Blanchard and Quah methodology to 21 
Eastern and Southern Africa countries using the sample period 1970-2002; they used 
correlations of shocks as the basis of their assessment of membership in monetary union. 
Buigut (2006) used the same correlations for a sample of 20 Eastern and Southern African 
economies; these correlations formed one set of variables analyzed. Buigut also 
considered trade integration among the economies concerned, debt-service ratios, public-
debt ratios, tax-revenue ratios, and inflation rates. Using these variables, Buigut applied 
                                                 
22 The criticism of the linearity and fixed-coefficients’ assumptions applies to the other statistical methods 
(e.g., correlations) used to gauge the suitability of countries to form a monetary union. For a discussion of 
the implications of the linearity assumption, see Hondroyiannis, Swamy and Tavlas (2008). For a discussion 
of the implications of the restriction on the number of shocks, see Enders (2004, pp. 309-10). Swamy and 
Tavlas (2007) provided a critique of fixed- coefficient models. 
  18cluster analysis, a technique that identifies groups of observations, whereby groups are 
constructed according to similarities among sample elements. That is, under cluster 
analysis, once the number of exchange-rate regimes (in this case, two regimes - - 
monetary union and all other regimes) is determined ex ante by the researcher, economies 
are placed into the groups according the similarity of behavior of the variables considered.  
3.  Correlations of exchange rates/terms-of-trade and/or casual inspection of data. 
Authors of three studies in this group calculated simple cross-country correlations - - 
Masson and Pattillo (2005) estimated correlations of per cent changes in the terms of trade 
for 14 SADC countries over the period 1987-99; Wang et al. (2006) calculated 
correlations of per cent changes in the terms of trade for Botswana and the four CMA 
economies over the period, 1980-2005; and, Jefferis (2007) calculated correlations of 
movements of bilateral nominal exchange rates of 12 SADC countries for the periods 
1990-96 and 1997-2002 against the South African rand, under the assumption that South 
Africa would be the key member of any regional monetary union. As is the case for 
studies that consider correlations of output growth rates, studies that consider correlations 
of exchange rates and the terms-of-trade are subject to the criticism that the variables 
considered are endogenous, and capture both the effects of shocks and the policy 
responses of the authorities. 
Studies by Grandes (2003) and Khamfula and Huizinga (2004) used more elaborate 
statistical methodologies in dealing with correlations of exchange rates than the three sets 
of authors above. Using monthly data over the period 1990:1-2001:4 for Botswana and the 
four CMA countries, Grandes tested for cointegration among bilateral real exchange rates, 
using the rand as the base currency. Under Grandes’ set-up, the four bilateral rates were 
tested for cointegration in vectors containing each of the remaining bilateral rates. If the 
relationships were stationary, the author inferred that the real exchange rates exhibited 
common trends. Consequently, a finding of stationarity meant that the countries had been 
subjected to symmetric shocks. 
Khamfula and Huizinga (2004) used a GARCH model to estimate correlations of 
unanticipated components of bilateral real exchange rates of nine SADC countries against 
the South African rand. Using both monthly and quarterly data over the period 1980-96, 
the authors’ procedure included the following steps. (1) After calculating bilateral real 
rates against the rand, they seasonally adjusted the change in each bilateral rate using 
seasonal dummies. The authors calculated two sets of residuals - - one for the monthly 
  19data and the other for the quarterly data. (2) The authors regressed each of the residuals on 
its own lags (up to seven lags). They used the residuals from those equations as estimates 
of unanticipated residuals.
23 (3) They used the squares of these unanticipated residuals as 
measures of underlying shocks. Khamfula and Huizinga (2004, p. 702) characterized the 
monthly and quarterly residuals as the “short-run and long-run cases”, respectively, a 
characterization discussed below. 
Authors of two studies relied mainly on informal inspection of macroeconomic 
variables. As noted above, Jefferis (2007) calculated correlations of bilateral nominal-
exchange-rate movements of 12 SADC countries against the South African rand. That 
author also calculated inflation differentials and interest-rate differentials vis-à-vis South 
Africa for the same set of countries. All calculations were made for the periods 1990-96 
and 1997-2002, the idea being to assess whether convergence vis-à-vis South Africa had 
taken place during these two periods. Similarly, Dutu and Sparks (2004) assessed the 
degree of convergence among 14 SADC countries over the period 1995-98. The variables 
considered by those authors included annual bilateral exchange-rate changes against the 
South African rand, inflation rates, external debt-to-GDP ratios, and openness. 
4.  Trade integration. Yehoue (2005) adopted a different empirical methodology 
from those described above; the author set up a dynamic game based on trade links. On 
the presumption that countries that have intra-trade above a certain threshold (in 
relationship to each country’s GDP), Yehoue’s game proceeded as follows. Suppose, as 
Yehoue did, that the threshold for intra-trade between a particular group of countries is 
two per cent; countries with bilateral trade above that threshold would (by assumption) 
benefit from a monetary union. To get the game started, it is necessary to identify a 
potential anchor country. Call this potential anchor country A. Now suppose that country 
B’s bilateral trade (exports plus imports) with country A is 2.5 per cent of country B’s 
GDP. Because this 2.5 per cent exceeds the threshold, according to the rules of the game it 
is in the interest country B to form a monetary union in the first stage of the game. 
Suppose, also, that country C’s bilateral trade shares with country A and country B are 1.5 
per cent and 1.0 per cent, respectively. Country C, therefore, would not form a monetary 
union with country A in the first stage. Yet, after countries A and B formed a monetary 
union, country C’s bilateral trade share with that union (i.e., countries A and B combined) 
                                                 
23 In effect, the residuals from the regressions of residuals on their own lags formed the unanticipated 
residuals. 
  20would be 2.5 per cent, exceeding the threshold. Thus, the union would expand to include 
three countries in the second stage. The game would continue until the bilateral trade 
shares (relative to the monetary union) of each of the remaining countries outside the 
monetary union is less than the threshold. In setting up this game for SADC countries, 
Yehoue used South Africa as the anchor of the monetary union (i.e., to initiate the 
dynamic game). 
3.3  The Empirical Evidence 
The empirical literature dealing with the traditional OCA criteria (i.e., assuming 
fixed economic structures) does not provide clear-cut evidence that any particular group of 
countries in Southern Africa is suitable for monetary union, although some evidence 
suggests that a small group of countries, typically including South Africa, could form a 
common-currency area. Authors of studies comparing correlations of output growth 
typically find weak correlations of this variable among the economies. In their study of 11 
SADC countries, Bayoumi and Ostry (1997) found that 42 out of 55 (bilateral) growth 
correlations were positive. However, most of the correlations were low; to provide some 
context, only four correlations exceeded 0.40. For South Africa, one correlation was 
higher than 0.40 - - that with Zambia (at 0.48). In contrast to Bayoumi and Ostry, who 
calculated bilateral correlations among SADC countries, Karras (2007) calculated 
correlations for nine SADC countries against the SADC as a whole, a less-informative 
procedure than that of Bayoumi and Ostry since the South African economy comprises 
about 67 per cent of the SADC economy. Essentially, Karras’s correlations reflected 
bilateral correlations vis-à-vis South Africa.
 24 In addition, Karras did not include 
Botswana and the three CMA countries (i.e., Lesotho, Namimbia, and Swaziland) in his 
sample; given the relatively-high bilateral trade shares of these countries with South 
Africa, the correlations of their GDPs with that of South Africa would be expected to be 
relatively high. Three of the eight sets of correlations (apart from those involving South 
Africa) reported by Karras were above 0.40 - - those for Mozambique, Zambia, and 
                                                 
24 Not surprisingly, his estimated correlations for South Africa exceeded 0.90. Authors who calculated 
bilateral correlations between each country considered and some aggregate of countries, such as the SADC, 
presupposed that the aggregate itself constituted a monetary union. It could turn out, however, that some 
countries may decide not to participate in a monetary union, so that the aggregate (e.g, all SADC countries) 
would not be appropriate. 
  21Zimbabwe - -indicating (according to Karras) that these three countries comprise an OCA 
with South Africa.
25
Studies that reported correlations of shocks to output growth based on 
autoregressions also do not provide more than weak support for monetary union. Bayoumi 
and Ostry calculated the significance levels of the correlations of shocks; those authors 
found that, out of 55 correlations, only five were positive and significant at the 10 per cent 
level. For South Africa, the only positive and significant correlation was with Zambia. 
Similarly, Wang et al. (2006), in their study of the four CMA countries, found only two 
(out of six) positive correlations of output shocks - - those for South Africa and Lesotho 
(.09) and South Africa and Namibia (.08). 
While Yehoue (2005) also used a second-order autoregressive process to generate 
output shocks, that author’s results represent an exception to the above pattern of findings. 
As did Karras (2007), Yehoue estimated co-movements of shocks for each of the (nine) 
SADC countries considered against the SADC as a whole. All of the co-movements 
obtained were positive and high. What explains the difference in findings between those 
obtained by Yehoue and those of Bayoumi and Ostry (1997) and Wang et al. (2006), who 
also used second-order autoregressive processes to extract shocks? The latter two studies 
calculated correlations of shocks to real per capita GDP growth. Yehoue, however, 
estimated autoregressive equations for levels of real GDP, which might be expected to 
show higher degrees of co-movements than per-capita GDP growth. His results were 
generally supportive of the hypothesis that a monetary union among the entire group of 
SADC economies is feasible. Yehoue’s results, however, did not account for the non-
stationarity that is typically present in output data expressed in levels. Thus, his results 
may have reflected specification errors arising from non-stationarity. 
As noted above, authors that use autoregressive methods to extract shocks from the 
data are not able to decompose shocks into their respective supply and demand 
components. Consequently, the finding of weak co-movements of shocks in studies using 
autoregressive methods may reflect a predominance of asymmetric demand shocks, which 
may be policy-induced. Buigut and Valev (2006), using the Blanchard-Quah 
decomposition to derive a measure of supply shocks, obtained results that the authors 
considered supportive of monetary union (in that the results indicated that supply shocks 
                                                 
25 Recall, Karras (2006) used three filtering techniques to de-trend output growth. The author reported 
correlations for each country using data derived from each of the three techniques.  
  22were symmetric) among the following countries: Lesotho, Mozambique, South Africa, and 
Swaziland. Buigut (2006), who used cluster analysis to group several variables, including 
the correlation of shocks derived from the Blanchard-Quah methodology, also obtained 
support for a monetary union, under the assumption that the rand was the anchor currency, 
for a small group of countries - - Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, South Africa, and 
Swaziland. Under alternative scenarios involving (i) a multilateral monetary union with no 
single country making policy decisions, and, (ii) the euro as the anchor currency, Buigut 
found that a core group of four countries - - Botswana, Namibia, South Africa, and 
Swaziland - - was suitable for monetary union.  
A similar mixed picture applies to the results of correlations of changes in exchange 
rates and/or the terms of trade. Grandes (2003), who estimated cointegration relationships 
among the exchange rates of the currencies of Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, and 
Swaziland against the South African rand, found evidence of common stochastic trends, 
providing support for monetary union among the five countries considered. His findings, 
therefore, were similar to those reported by Buigut (2006). However, the results obtained 
by Masson and Pattillo (2005) and Wang et al. (2006) were less supportive of monetary 
union. Masson and Pattillo (2005) derived 91 pair-wise correlations of changes in the 
terms of trade for SADC countries; of those, 14 were positive and significant. Of the 14, 
four involved South Africa - - i.e., those with Botswana, the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo, Mozambique, and Namibia. Wang et al. (2006), in their evaluation of terms-of-
trade correlations among the CMA countries plus Botswana, found that two (of 10) 
correlations were above 0.20 - - those for Botswana with South Africa, and Botswana with 
Lesotho. 
In their study of ten SADC countries, Khanfula and Huizinga (2004) obtained results 
supporting a five-member monetary union. As noted, Khanfula and Huizinga estimated 
unanticipated components among bilateral real exchange rates using both monthly and 
quarterly frequencies; the authors referred to their results using monthly data as the “short-
run case” and the results using quarterly data as the “long-run case”. Both sets of results 
provided support for a monetary union involving Mauritius, Malawi, South Africa, and 
Zimbabwe. 
To summarize the findings discussed thus far, most authors either (1) did not obtain 
results supportive of monetary unification among the countries considered or (2) found 
that their results supported a monetary union comprised of relatively-small group of 
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Botswana. Two main factors help account for these findings. First, most SADC countries 
have narrow export bases and the composition of exports varies considerably among 
countries. Thus, it would be expected that movements of such variables as de-trended real 
GDP and the terms of trade would not exhibit high correlations. Second, some SADC 
countries, especially Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, and Swaziland, have high shares of 
trade with South Africa. Therefore, it is expected that those countries exhibit relatively-
high co-movements of output growth (through trade multipliers) with South Africa.  
 Two other factors deserve to be noted. First, until the late-1990s, empirical work 
that used methodologies similar to those described above typically showed that only a 
small core of European countries, often including Austria, Belgium, Germany, and 
Luxemburg, showed the high correlations of output growth and/or of shocks to output 
growth that theory held necessary for an optimum currency area.
26 Second, the CMA in 
Southern Africa has had a substantial history as a well-functioning, hard exchange-rate 
arrangement despite large differences in structural characteristics among the members. 
Exceptions to the foregoing empirical results are the findings in studies by Yehoue 
(2005), Dutu and Sparks (2004), and Jefferis (2007); each of these studies suggested that 
monetary unions comprising at least seven countries are feasible. As noted, Yehoue found 
high co-movements of shocks in output levels among nine SADC countries, suggesting 
that those countries could form a monetary union.
27 Additionally, using his framework 
based on endogenously-formed trade externalities, Yehoue (2005) found that, with the 
four CMA countries as a core group, dynamic trade links would lead to a 23-member 
monetary union among African economies. Dutu and Sparks (2004), in their consideration 
of the desirability of a monetary union among 14 SADC countries, found what they 
interpreted as low levels of nominal convergence among most of the countries considered 
in their study. Although Dutu and Sparks inferred that the SADC does not constitute an 
OCA, the authors concluded that the CMA could be expanded to include Botswana, 
Mauritius, and Seychelles. Jefferis (2007), in his assessment of the feasibility of monetary 
union among the 14 SADC countries, considered coefficients of variation of bilateral 
(nominal) exchange rates against the South African rand, and interest-rate differentials and 
inflation differentials vis-à-vis South Africa. The author concluded that eight countries 
                                                 
26 For a survey of the empirical literature, see De Grawe (2007, pp. 85-90). 
27 As pointed out, Yehoue’s method of extracting shocks from data in levels may have led to specification 
errors. 
  24comprised a “convergence group”: Botswana, Lesotho, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, 
South Africa, Swaziland, and Tanzania.  
The findings by Yehoue (2005), Dutu and Sparks (2004), and Jefferis (2007) warrant 
the following comments. (1) In setting up a dynamic game, under which countries would 
want to join a monetary union if their trade shares (relative to GDP) exceeded a pre-
specified threshold, Yehoue assumed a trade-share threshold of two per cent of GDP. 
Countries that had trade shares with the monetary union in excess of two per cent would 
want to join the union. The two per cent threshold, however, appears to be low, arbitrary, 
and asymmetric.
28 It is asymmetric because it considers only the possible benefits to the 
countries that are outside the monetary union. In his game, there was no threshold for the 
countries inside the union. In other words, the author did not specify welfare criteria that 
could motivate countries inside the union to accept new entrants. Thus, both the low level 
of the threshold and the asymmetric nature of the game were conducive to the formation 
of large monetary unions. (2) As mentioned, Dutu and Sparks (2004) and Jefferis (2007) 
did not provide formal analyses of the sets of data that they considered. Dutu and Sparks’ 
recommendation of the feasibility of a seven-member CMA was based on inferences that 
relied on arbitrary thresholds.
29 That is, to infer whether there existed sufficient 
macroeconomic convergence among countries, the authors established thresholds, or 
limits, which, if exceeded, were interpreted as suggesting that the countries concerned did 
not qualify for monetary union. For example, in assessing whether the degree of (nominal) 
bilateral exchange-rate movement against the South African rand qualified for 
convergence, Dutu and Sparks set an annual threshold of 5 per cent with regard to the 
maximum allowable nominal appreciation/depreciation against the rand. Jefferis’ 
inference of an eight-member “convergence club” appears to have been based strictly on a 
casual inspection of the data. The author did not explain what criterion was used to assess 




                                                 
28 Yehoue (2005, p. 9) referred to the arbitrary nature of the two-per cent cut-off. He justified it by arguing 
that, in a similar study, Alesina, Barro, and Tenreyro (2002) had used an arbitrary cut-off. The latter authors 
used a six per cent cut-off. 
29 In fact, Dutu and Sparks (2004) referred to the arbitrary nature of their thresholds. 
  254. Endogenous OCA Analysis 
Whereas earlier work on OCAs sought to identify the characteristics that an 
economy should satisfy prior to joining a monetary union (i.e., ex ante), the “new” theory 
of OCAs has focused on changes in economic structure and performance that may result 
from participation in a monetary union (i.e., ex post).
30 Endogenous OCA theory has 
identified two main transmission channels through which a common currency may affect 
an economy’s performance. These channels operate via increased trade integration and 
enhanced credibility.  
1.  Trade integration. Greater trade integration is thought to increase growth by 
increasing allocative efficiency and accelerating the transfer of knowledge. Endogenous 
OCA theory posits that a common currency (as opposed to separate currencies tied 
together with fixed exchange rates) can promote trade and growth. The basic intuition 
underlying this hypothesis is that a set of national currencies is a significant barrier to 
trade. According to this view, in addition to removing the costs of currency conversion, a 
single currency and a common monetary policy preclude future competitive devaluations, 
increase price transparency, facilitate foreign direct and portfolio investment, and the 
building of long-term relationships, and might (over time) encourage forms of political 
integration within the union (Mongelli, 2002). These outcomes would, in turn, promote 
(over-and-above what may have been attained on the basis of the elimination of exchange-
rate uncertainty among separate currencies) reciprocal trade, economic and financial 
integration, and the accumulation of knowledge (Rose and Van Wincoop, 2001; Mongelli, 
2002).
31 These effects are said to increase the productivity of capital and labor and, 
therefore, to raise potential output (De Grauwe, 2002). Additionally, increased trade 
integration is said to result in more-highly-correlated business cycles because of common 
demand shocks and greater intra-industry trade, lessening the need of country-specific 
monetary policies (Frankel and Rose, 1998). 
 2.  Credibility. The earlier (i.e., circa 1970s and 1980s) literature on the merits of 
fixed exchange rates stressed the disciplining character of such regimes. Policy bias 
                                                 
30 Endogenous OCA analysis leads to the view that an economy that fails to satisfy OCA criteria prior to 
entry into a monetary union may, nevertheless, satisfy the criteria as a result of entry into a monetary union 
(see Frankel and Rose, 1998). Unlike the earlier OCA theory, which did not distinguish between a rigidly-
pegged exchange-rate regime and monetary unification, the new OCA framework stresses the potential 
benefits of a monetary union.   
31 Theoretical and empirical work on the relationship between exchange-rate uncertainty and trade has not 
uncovered a negative linkage. For a recent discussion, see Clark, Tamirisa, and Wei (2004).  
  26towards discipline was thought to be fostered for two primary reasons. First, the country’s 
reserves are put on the line, and the quantity of such reserves is limited. Second, the 
authorities who devalue are often considered to have failed in their macroeconomic 
management. The discipline hypothesis posited that an exchange-rate commitment would 
help a high-inflation country attain a low-inflation equilibrium, but at a cost. Along the 
way to lower inflation, the country in question would experience the higher 
unemployment and lower output that derive from any restrictive policies.
 32   
During the past thirty years or so, a number of theoretical developments have 
contributed to a consensus among economists stressing the role of credibility in the 
formulation of monetary policy, whereby credibility is typically interpreted as the extent 
to which the present announcement by the monetary authorities in the present of future 
intentions are taken at face value.
33 Several such developments are important to mention. 
(1) Lucas and Sargent (Lucas, 1976; Lucas and Sargent, 1981) showed that the public’s 
expectations about inflation depend upon expectations about the evolution of policy. 
Specifically, inflation expectations could be made to conform to a central bank’s inflation 
objective if a central bank was credibly committed to following a noninflationary 
monetary-policy rule (Goodfriend, 2007, p. 50; Lacker and Weinberg, 2007, p. 222). (2) 
Kydland and Prescott (1977) showed that a central bank that engaged in discretionary 
policies has an incentive to promise low inflation and then to run an expansionary 
monetary policy aimed at lowering unemployment (Goodfriend, 2007, p. 51). As such, the 
discretionary policy is time-inconsistent, whereby time-inconsistency refers to (under 
rational expectations and a vertical long-term Phillips curve at the natural rate of 
unemployment) the unwillingness of the public to believe that the central bank will really 
commit to what it pronounces, and this circumstance affects the range of choices available 
to the central bank (Cobham, 1998, p. 217). Among the implications of this line of 
research are the following: (1) a policy rule provides a better outcome (i.e., lower inflation 
at the natural rate of unemployment) than discretionary monetary policy, and (2) to be 
credible, the monetary authorities must demonstrate that they are fully committed to a 
                                                 
32 The earlier literature on OCAs  treated the similarity of inflation rates between or among countries as a  
precondition for monetary union, the idea being that, if inflation  rates between  countries are similar, an 
equilibrated flow of current-account transactions is more likely to take place among these countries than 
when inflation rates are divergent (see Fleming, 1971; Ishiyama, 1975). 
33 The theoretical developments have been complemented with empirical work demonstrating the 
inflationary bias inherent in discretionary monetary policy (Barro and Gordon, 1983). This bias stems from 
two main sources: (1) attempts to over-stimulate economies on average, and (2) incentives to monetize 
budget deficits and debts (Alesina and Barro, 2001, p. 382). 
  27low-inflation objective so that they will not exploit the opportunity provided by high 
inflation (Barro, 2008, pp. 383-87). 
An upshot of the foregoing developments has been the emphasis, in both academic 
work and practice, on the use of pre-commitment arrangements that prevent the central 
bank from yielding to the temptation to inflate. Pre-commitment technologies include the 
announcement of an inflation target and/or a statute granting independence to the central 
bank. In an open-economy context, fixing the exchange rate against the currency of a low 
inflation country or joining a monetary union (including the adoption of a common 
currency) with a credible central bank have been considered (and used) as pre-
commitment mechanisms. In the aftermath of the succession of speculative attacks against 
mostly-pegged exchange-rate regimes in the 1990s and early 2000s, however, a fixed 
exchange-rate arrangement is no longer considered a viable option. Consequently, in the 
open economy context, increased attention has been given to monetary unification as a 
means of deriving credibility.
34  
If agents in the goods, labor, and foreign-exchange markets believe that the 
commitment to adopt a common currency is sustainable, so that it changes agents’ 
expectations, the output and employment costs of attaining a low-inflation equilibrium are 
reduced. Since there is no devaluation risk and, therefore, no need of an interest-rate 
premium to cover the risk of devaluation, nominal and real interest rates are lower than 
otherwise. With low and stable inflation, and lower interest rates, economic horizons 
lengthen, encouraging a transformation of the financial sector, thereby promoting risk 
taking and stimulating private investment, fostering faster growth (Dornbusch, 2001).
35 It 
should be noted, however, that a monetary union is likely to be credible only if it is in the 
economic and political interests of its members to remain in the union, an issue that has 
not been adequately addressed in the literature. 
                                                 
34 In addition to supporting monetary unification, this argument has often been used in support of currency 
boards or dollarisation for economies that have had histories of relatively-high inflation associated with 
profligate macroeconomic policies (e.g., Barro, 1999; Hausmann, 1999). The performance of alternate 
exchange-rate regimes with regard to inflation and other macroeconomic variables has been studied by 
Tavlas, Dellas and Stockman (2008). 
35 A related argument is that a pegged-rate system provides a nominal anchor in a disinflationary 
environment because of its effect on real money demand. If agents believe the disinflation policy associated 
with the peg is credible, interest rates fall so that the demand for real money balances rises and, for a given 
path of money growth, inflation falls. Because this argument applies to a limited set of circumstances, and 
because of the availability of alternative monetary rules that can provide a nominal anchor, the argument is 
not pursued here. For further discussion, see Stockman (1999). 
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of joining a common-currency area with a credible regional central bank can be 
substantial, even if a particular country’s characteristics (such as openness, asymmetry of 
shocks, and labour-market flexibility) do not appear to be very favorable for monetary 
unification.
36 Additionally, the literature on credibility leads to the following inference 
with respect to the use of adjustments of exchange rates of national currencies: an 
exchange-rate adjustment is not a flexible instrument that can be used frequently. Its 
present use affects its future effectiveness because it engenders strong expectational 
effects. Consequently, the benefits of using the instrument in the present need to be 
weighed against the costs of using the instrument in the future - - i.e., the effectiveness of 
future adjustments is likely to diminish if adjustments in the present have been frequent 
and/or large (De Grauwe, 2007, p. 52). 
4.1 Estimation Approaches and Results 
Several empirical studies deal with either the endogeneity of trade and/or credibility 
within the specific context of Southern-African countries. Specifically, Masson and 
Pattillo (2005) and Carrere (2004) considered the effects of a common currency on intra-
CMA trade and intra-SADC trade, respectively. Masson and Pattillo (2005), Masson 
(2006), and Guillaume-Stasavage (2000) considered the possible credibility gains 
attributable to a common currency. The approaches pursued by the authors of the studies 
and the results obtained are discussed in what follows. 
1. Trade creation. The workhorse model used in the empirical literature on the trade-
creation effects of a common currency is the gravity model (see Rose, 2000). The gravity 
model is usually specified to include as explanatory variables the product of the real GDPs 
of two economies, in both level and per-capita specifications, the distance between them, 
and the land area of the economies (Masson and Pattillo, 2005, p. 54). Dummy variables 
are included to capture the possible effects of common features of the economies, 
including: membership in a free-trade area or currency union and a common language, 
border and/or colonizer; and so on. The gravity equation is typically specified in 
logarithms, so that (excluding time subscripts): 
                                                 
36 This argument has been used to explain the reasons that countries such as Greece, Italy, and Portugal 
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37 The possible effect of monetary union on trade is captured by a dummy 
variable, under the presumption that separate national currencies act as a barrier on trade. 
Masson and Pattillo (2005) estimated equations based on the gravity model for the 
CMA countries. An aim of the exercise was to compare predictions of bilateral trade 
shares vis-à-vis South Africa with and without the currency-union dummy. For each of the 
three CMA countries other than South Africa, the results showed that bilateral trade with 
South Africa (as a percentage of total trade) was about 50 per cent higher with the 
currency-union dummy than without the dummy, suggesting that the CMA had provided a 
positive impact on intra-area trade. 
Carrere (2004) used the gravity model to study trade creation-effects arising from 
regional trade agreements and currency unions. In contrast to most authors, who use a 
dummy variable in the gravity model to capture the effects of a common currency on 
trade, Carrere used a measure of the volatility of the bilateral nominal exchange rate 
among the currencies of the countries considered. Applying this measure to the SADC 
countries, the author obtained results that were “quite difficult to interpret” (Carrere, 2003, 
p. 227). It appears, however, that the exchange-rate-volatility variable used to examine the 
trade-creation effects of a common currency is not an appropriate measure of such a 
currency. As noted above, (1) most empirical studies that investigate relationships 
between trade and exchange-rate volatility obtain inconclusive results (see footnote 27), 
and (2) the trade-creation effects of a common currency are purported to be over-and-
above what may have been attained on the basis of the elimination of exchange-rate 
volatility among separate currencies. 
2. Credibility. Masson and Pattillo (2005) used a calibrated model, based on data for 
1995-2000, to consider the monetary impact of country-specific differences in preferences 
                                                 
37 This description of the gravity model is based on Masson and Pattillo (2005, p. 54). 
  30with respect to the size of the government sector, distortions (political and/or structural) 
affecting fiscal policy, and asymmetries of shocks. Effectively, the model was constructed 
around three factors that determined the benefit-cost calculus of monetary union: (1) 
inflation performance of each country relative to the average inflation of all the potential 
members of a monetary union; (2) asymmetry of shocks among the potential members; 
and (3) fiscal performance of each country relative to the average of all countries. The 
main elements of the model (described in Masson and Pattillo, 2005, pp. 171-81) were: an 
expectations-augmented Phillips Curve, extended to include international spillovers from 
neighbors’ monetary policies; a government budget constraint; and an assumed objective 
function for the government that depended linearly on higher output, and negatively on 
squared deviations of inflation from a target that reflected supply shocks. Masson and 
Pattillo assumed that, for countries not in a monetary union, governments’ exerted control 
over national central banks. In contrast, the authors assumed that in a monetary union the 
central bank maximized a weighted average of the member countries’ objective functions 
(where weights reflected relative GDPs) while each government chose its own fiscal 
policy. In each case, governments satisfied a one-period budget constraint that forced 
spending to be financed either by taxes or by a country’s share of monetary financing. A 
key linkage in the model was the effect of spending targets on inflation and taxes, since 
higher spending needed to be financed. Since spending targets were unobservable, Masson 
and Pattillo estimated a relationship under which countries with higher per-capita incomes 
could generally afford to offer more government services; as both revenues and spending 
rose in tandem, this component did not cause a problem for inflation. However, a second 
force tending to increase spending targets was the attempt by governments in power to 
reward their supporters - - which was a symptom of cronyism or corruption. To take 
account of the latter factor, Masson and Pattillo used indices of corruption and 
institutional development and measures of diversion of spending away from health and 
education toward what the authors judged to be less-crucial areas. 
Masson and Pattillo (2005) performed two simulations to analyze the costs and 
benefits of a monetary union among SADC economies. In one simulation the authors 
calculated the net gains, relative to floating exchange rates, of an asymmetric monetary 
union under which monetary policy reflected the inflation performance of the South 
African Reserve Bank (based on inflation rates in South Africa during 1995-2000). Under 
the other simulation, the authors calculated the net gains, relative to the situation that 
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inflation during 1995-2000 among all countries considered). Separate simulations were 
made for the four CMA countries and for 13 SADC countries. For both sets of countries, 
the results indicated that an asymmetric monetary union would result in gains for all 
participants, whereas a symmetric union would result in losses for most countries. 
Underlying these results was the tendency for many SADC countries to have incurred 
large fiscal deficits, financed to a considerable extent through money creation, over the 
period considered by the authors. Thus, countries such as Zimbabwe, would not make 
desirable partners in a symmetric monetary union. Masson and Pattillo (2005, p. 176) 
concluded that “economic logic would suggest that the SARB [South African Reserve 
Bank] continue to set monetary policy [based on South Africa’s economic situation], 
meaning that a SADC exchange-rate union would essentially be a rand zone”. 
In Masson and Pattillo’s simulations, no account was taken of the possible trade-
creation effects of a monetary union among all the SADC countries. Yet, such trade-
creation effects would benefit the members of a monetary union and should be accounted 
for in a calibration exercise aimed at calculating the benefits and costs of a common 
currency. To address this issue, Masson (2006) extended the calibration model used by 
Masson and Pattillo (2005) so that it incorporated the benefits of increased trade resulting 
from a monetary unification. Assuming that a regional SADC currency would double 
intra-SADC trade, and that the regional central bank set monetary policy to reflect the 
average conditions of the region (i.e., the symmetric case), Masson (2006) obtained the 
following results: (1) with the exception of Mauritius, each of the SADC countries that are 
non-CMA members would gain under a monetary union;
38 and, (2) each of the CMA 
countries would lose, though the losses were less than half  those yielded by simulations 
that did not take account of trade-creation effects. Thus, in the case of the CMA countries, 
the losses stemming from higher inflation in a symmetric monetary union would outweigh 
any benefits due to the trade-creation effects of a regional currency.
39 As was the case in 
the study by Masson and Patillo (2005), Masson’s (2006) findings support a monetary 
                                                 
38 Masson and Pattillo (2005) did not include Mauritius in their sample of 13 SADC countries. 
39 Unlike Masson and Patillo (2005), Masson (2006) did not consider the case of an asymmetric monetary 
union under which monetary policy reflected the inflation performance of the South African Reserve Bank, 
because that author’s earlier work with Patillo showed that case to be welfare improving, unlike the 
symmetric case; thus, there was no reason to examine whether a rise in trade made monetary union 
desirable.  
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the union.  
The issue of the possible gains from the credibility of a regional central bank was 
also dealt with by Guillaume and Stasavage (2000). The authors compared measures of 
checks and balances in political systems to assess what countries might gain by the 
credibility of a regional central bank. These measures included the degree of party 
fractionalization and levels of constraints on the executive branch; Guillaume-Stasavage’s 
study covered the sample period 1968-93. The idea underlying the authors’ approach is 
that relatively-high fractionalization and/or strong constraints on the executive branch are 
likely to involve higher costs of reneging on policy rules because, for example, higher 
levels of fractionalization tend to result in a greater possibility of coalition governments. 
Under these conditions, power is shared among parties, any one of which could bring 
down the government if the monetary policy to which it subscribed (and agreed as a 
condition of supporting the executive) were to be violated. Consequently, Guillaume and 
Stasavage argued that countries with relatively-low levels of fractionalization and/or 
relatively-strong executive branches are likely to be better candidates for monetary unions 
than countries with high levels of fractionalization and/or weak executive branches since 
such unions would include regional central banks, making it more costly for those 
countries to renege on the rules.
40 Guillaume and Stasavage also considered measures of 
political shocks (i.e., number of coups, numbers of cabinet changes) to judge the 
suitability of monetary-union participation; the authors argued that countries with higher 
levels of political shocks would gain by the stability that could be provided by a regional 
central bank, which would be under less country-specific pressures to follow profligate 
policies. 
Based on an analysis of the above data, Guillaume and Stasavage reached a 
favorable assessment concerning the effects of monetary union.
41 The authors found that 
many of the countries considered lacked the checks and balances in their political 
institutions necessary to conduct a credible monetary policy at the national level. Thus, 
Guillaume and Stasavage inferred that regional monetary unions could provide credibility 
                                                 
40 The argument that broad coalitions make reneging on rules more costly can be criticised since, under 
broad coalitions, the costs of reneging can be spread out, making reneging more likely. 
41 Guillaume and Stasavage’s assessment pertained to monetary unions among African economies more 
generally. In light of the fact that the evidence on political variables presented by the authors for the SADC 
countries was similar to that presented for other African regions, the inference drawn with respect to Africa 
more generally seems to apply to the SADC countries. 
  33if exit from the union were made costly by the existence of parallel regional arrangements 
and/or links to financial and/or technical assistance from industrial countries. 
4.2. Discussion 
In sum, those authors that have addressed the trade-creation and credibility effects of 
monetary unions find that, under the assumption of a credible regional central bank, a 
common currency and single monetary policy could provide net benefits for most 
Southern-African countries. The literature also suggests that, in a monetary union 
comprised of all SADC countries and a regional central bank that set monetary policy to 
reflect the average economic conditions (e.g., fiscal balances) in the region, the potential 
losses (i.e., higher inflation) from giving up an existing credible national central bank, 
relevant in the case of South Africa and the other CMA countries, could outweigh any 
potential benefits of trade creation resulting from a common currency. The relatively small 
number of studies dealing with the endogeneity issue in the Southern-African context 
indicates, however, that more research is needed before anything approaching a definitive 
conclusion can be reached on the matter. 
As is the case with all monetary unions, a monetary union in Southern Africa is 
likely to be credible only if the institutional design of the new regional central bank is 
such that the central bank is given de facto (and not just de jure) independence. In the case 
of the European Central Bank (ECB), for example, institutional independence and the 
primacy of the objective of price stability were enshrined in the Maastricht Treaty. To 
enhance the credibility of the ECB, a monetary-policy strategy, which includes the 
monitoring of money growth, was formulated and based, in part, on the strategy of the 
Bundesbank (Issing, 2006, pp. 3-4); the latter institution had established a reputation as a 
credible central bank by keeping German inflation relatively low over several decades 
(Tavlas, 1991). In the Southern African context, the following problems must be 
addressed by the member states. First, the South African Reserve Bank has established a 
credible reputation of keeping inflation relatively low. This credibility, combined with the 
dominant role of South Africa’s economy in the region, suggests that the policy 
framework of the South African Reserve Bank should play an influential role in the design 
of the institutional framework of a new regional bank. Second, creation of a regional 
central bank would likely have to be accompanied by the creation of other consultative 
and/or supranational structures. Without a Southern African counterpart to the European 
Parliament, for example, the transfer of national sovereignty that would occur with the 
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legitimacy.
42 Issues related to the establishment of a credible regional central bank in 
Southern Africa, however, including decision procedures, guarantees of independence, 
accountability, the degree of operational decentralization in the implementation of open-
market and discount-window operations, the composition of the monetary union, the 
distribution of seignorage, and the distribution of the fiscal burden in the event of lender-
of-last-resort operations, have not been studied to the extent that is needed before 
proceeding to a regional monetary union.
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5. Concluding Remarks 
In addition to differences in empirical methodologies, countries considered, and 
sample periods, a major source of difficulty in interpreting empirical findings of 
investigations of the desirability and/or feasibility of monetary union in Southern Africa is 
that there are relatively few cross-references among authors of studies, making it difficult 
to place particular empirical findings in a broader context. The foregoing review of the 
literature attempted to identify the main thrust of the empirical findings. The review points 
to the following conclusions. 
(1) Authors of studies dealing with the traditional OCA criteria tend to focus on 
correlations of (a) de-trended real growth rates, (b) shocks to output growth, (c) real 
exchange rates, and/or (d) terms-of-trade. The underlying assumption of this methodology 
is that high correlations of such factors as de-trended output growth and the terms-of-trade 
diminish the need of country-specific monetary and exchange-rate policies. Most authors 
find that SADC economies are subject to asymmetric shocks (e.g, weak and/or negative 
co-movements in de-trended real growth rates), reflecting differences in the major exports 
among the countries concerned and divergences in movements of the prices of those 
exports. Thus, a general inference of studies in this genre is that a common currency and 
single monetary policy may not be appropriate for all the SADC countries. Some authors, 
however, obtained results supportive of a monetary union comprised of a relatively-small 
group of countries, usually including South Africa, sometimes with other CMA countries 
and Botswana. 
                                                 
42 This argument was made by Buiter (1999) and Kenen and Meade (2008) with respect to the creation of a 
regional central bank in North America. 
43 With regard to credibility, the work by Guillaume and Stasavage (2000) is a partial exception. 
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formation of European monetary union in 1999. The early empirical literature on the 
correlation of GDP growth rates and/or shocks to output growth for such countries 
typically pointed to only small groups of European countries as suitable for a monetary 
union. Yet, the euro area has been a well-functioning monetary union despite membership 
by a much-larger group of countries. In addition, the CMA has been a well-functioning, 
hard, exchange-rate arrangement despite a wide diversity of structural characteristics 
among its members. 
(3) Although many SADC countries tend to have low shares of intra-SADC trade, 
those countries that have relatively-high intra-trade shares within the SADC region tend to 
experience relatively-high business-cycle co-movements, suggesting that a common 
currency among these countries may be appropriate. Typically, the countries in this group 
have high intra-trade shares with South Africa. 
(4) Trade shares are not invariant to the existence of a single currency. Empirical 
evidence pertaining to the fixed-exchange-rate arrangement (including the use of the 
South African rand as legal tender in each of the four CMA countries) among the CMA 
countries suggests that the CMA may have raised intra-trade by 50 per cent compared to 
the share that would have existed in the absence of that arrangement. 
(5) A key issue in the formation of a common-currency area among SADC 
economies concerns the credibility of a regional central bank. Other things equal, 
members of a monetary union would benefit from lower inflation than they would face if 
they retained separate currencies because the common central bank would internalize 
pressures to follow expansionary monetary policies associated with exchange-rate 
depreciations among separate currencies (i.e., beggar-thy-neighbor policies). 
(6) Although national policies can, to some extent, be used to deal with asymmetric 
shocks among the nations participating in a currency union, as the experience of the euro 
area has shown the systematic use of this instrument can lead to problems of debt 
sustainability. The SADC approach to monetary union is based on the principles of 
gradualism and conditionality. These principles must be applied strictly to ensure the 
viability of a Southern African monetary union; endogeneity of the OCA criteria will help 
ameliorate some - - but not all - - asymmetries among Southern African countries. 
  36(7) The case of the SADC is unique among potential monetary unions in the African 
and European regions because of the dominant role of the one economy, that of South 
Africa within its region and the credibility of the monetary policy of the South African 
Reserve Bank.
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(8) The above factors point to the desirability of a selective and gradual approach to 
monetary unification in Southern Africa, centered on the CMA as a core monetary union. 
As neighboring countries demonstrate an ability to deliver disciplined and stable 
macroeconomic policies - - particularly with respect to fiscal balances - - they could 
become members of the monetary union. Such a selective and gradual approach could 
build on the credibility of the existing monetary arrangement (i.e., the CMA) in Southern 
Africa.
45
(9) In the light of the narrow export base of most SADC countries, consideration 
could be given to a public insurance scheme among the members of a monetary union. 
Under such a scheme, members would be temporarily insured from large fluctuations in 
their revenues. The design of such a scheme would, however, have to deal with the 
problem of moral hazard so that it does not reduce the willingness and/or ability of 
countries to adjust in the event that shocks are permanent. 
 Although the members of the SADC have set the objective of adopting a common 
currency in 2018, and have proposed interim convergence criteria to help mark the road to 
monetary union, to date the SADC has provided very little in terms of official published 
documentation dealing with such key issues as the benefits and costs of a Southern 
African monetary union, the degree of factor mobility, both within and among the 
countries concerned, the rationale of convergence criteria, the reasons underlying the 
choice of the particular quantitative (interim) convergence criteria, the role (if any) of real 
convergence as a criterion for entry into the monetary union, the institutional design of a 
prospective regional central bank, the stability (or lack thereof) of the demand for money 
and the nature of the monetary transmission mechanism in the countries concerned, the 
delegation of banking supervision, the type of exchange-rate regime of the monetary union 
vis-à-vis the rest of the world, and the institution responsible for the management of 
                                                 
44 As noted above, South Africa’s GDP accounts for about 67 per cent of SADC GDP. In the euro area, by 
contrast, Germany’s GDP, the largest GDP in the euro area, is almost matched by that of France; in 2006, 
Germany’s GDP accounted for 27.5 per cent of euro-area GDP while France’s GDP accounted for 21.3 per 
cent of euro-area GDP (European Central Bank, 2007). 
45 Masson and Patillo (2005) also argued that a monetary union in Southern Africa should be selective and 
based on the satisfaction of fiscal convergence criteria. 
  37exchange-rate policy.
46 Moreover, although the use of nominal convergence criteria 
parallels the use of such criteria for entry into the euro area, the selection of convergence 
criteria for the euro area zone was preceded by a substantial amount of analytical 
research.
47 With studies dealing with the traditional OCA criteria suggesting that a 
common-currency area among all SADC countries may not be appropriate, further work 
on the endogeneity of the OCA criteria may help illuminate the extent to which the 
creation of an SADC monetary union might itself create the conditions necessary for a 
well-functioning union. Clearly, there is a need at the official level of systematic and 
















                                                 
46 Thus, the SADC website provides essentially no information about the prospective Southern African 
monetary union on its website. See www.sade.int. SADC central bank governors, however, have made 
numerous references to the prospective monetary union in their public speeches. In addition, the South 
African Reserve Bank has set up a Secretariat on the SADC monetary union. 
47 See, for example, the study by the Commission for the European Communities (1990). This study 
provided a detailed analysis of the benefits and costs of a monetary union in Europe, and included a 
quantitative estimate of the reduction in transactions costs of a single currency (projected to be equal to 
about one per cent of the European Community’s GDP).  
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Table 1: SADC Countries: Exchange-Rate Regimes 
 







Botswana Pula  Pegged to basket 
(South African rand and SDR)  Yes 
Congo,  
Democratic republic of  Congo franc  Independently floating 
 
Yes 
Lesotho Loti  Pegged to South African rand 
(CMA)  Yes 
Madagascar Ariary  Independently floating 
 
Yes 
Malawi Kwacha  Independently floating 
 
Yes 
Mauritius Rupee  Managed floating 
 
Yes 
Mozambique Metical  Managed floating 
 
Yes 
Namibia Namibia  dollar  Pegged to South African rand 
(CMA)  Yes 
South Africa  Rand  Independently floating; rand is 
CMA anchor currency  Yes 
Swaziland Lilangeni  Pegged to South African rand 
(CMA)  Yes 
Tanzania Shilling  Independently floating 
 
Yes 
Zambia Kwacha  Managed floating 
 
Yes 
Zimbabwe Zimbabwe  dollar  Adjustable peg against U.S. 
dollar; dual exchange rates  Yes 
 
Source: IMF, Exchange Rate Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions, 2006. 
 
Notes:    
Managed floating: The authorities influence exchange rate movements through active intervention to counter the long-term trend of 
the exchange rate, without specifying a predetermined exchange rate path, or without having a specific exchange rate target. 
Intervention may be direct or indirect. Indicators for managing the rate are broadly judgmental (e.g., balance of payments position, 
international reserves, parallel market developments), and adjustments may not be automatic. 
 
Independently floating: The exchange rate is market determined; any foreign exchange intervention aims at moderating the rate of 
change and preventing undue fluctuations in the exchange rate that are not justified by economic fundamentals, rather than at 
establishing a level for the exchange rate. In these regimes, monetary policy is in principle independent of exchange rate policy. 
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                      GDP Percent GDP Average GDP  per Average Inflation Current Trade Budget Addendum items 
 
(constant 

















%)   2001--2005 

















Angola  17593    7.3 20108  13.5  990  6.2  147.6  5.9  138.1  9.7      37936 5.2
Botswana  6835    2.8 10146  4.3  3818  4.0  7.9  3.2  74.7  11.3      19887 2.7
Congo, Dem. Rep.  5611    2.3 7782  5.9  93  1.0  301.8  ..  40.9  ..      38498 5.3
Lesotho  1049    0.4 1988  3.4  548  2.2  9.3  -17.0  125.5  ..      5554 0.8
Madagascar  4146    1.7 4364  2.6  239  -0.5  9.5  -5.6  74.9  ..      16036 2.2
Malawi  2004    0.8 2001  3.9  168  0.0  19.1  -10.2  59.0  -3.6      8312 1.1
Mauritius  5772    2.4 6694  4.1  4426  3.5  4.9  2.0  104.6  -5.3      14568 2.0
Mozambique  5895    2.4 5548  7.2  285  6.5  12.6  -11.9  62.1  2.1      23414 3.2
Namibia  4165    1.7 7589  3.6  1966  1.8  8.2  7.9  84.2  ..      14433 2.0
South Africa  162267    67.4 237216  3.5  3458  2.8  5.5  -3.8  52.7  0.6      489916 66.8
Swaziland  1579    0.7 2598  2.3  1365  0.6  9.4  -3.9  176.0  ..      5000 0.7
Tanzania  13417    5.6 10851  6.8  337  4.6  3.9  -9.8  45.6  -6.2      25641 3.5
Zambia  4254    1.8 5389  4.6  371  2.5  23.2  -17.1  51.2  -2.5      11258 1.5
Zimbabwe  6230    2.6 17750  -6.3  479  -7.8  90.9  ..  45.8  -11.3      22751 3.1
                                      







GDP (constant 2000 millions of US$),  latest year reported is 2006  
GDP (current US$, millions) latest year reported is 2006 
Average GDP growth (annual %) 2002--2006, 5 years 
GDP per capita (constant 2000 US$) latestyear reported is 2005 
Average GDP per capita growth (annual %) 2001--2005 
Inflation, consumer prices (annual %), average 2000--2004, 5 years 
Current account balance (% of GDP)  latest reported year is 2004 
Trade (% of GDP) latest reported year is 2006 
Budget Balance in % of GDP, values refer to the year 2006. 
GDP, PPP (constant 2000 international $, millions),  latest year reported is 2006  
Table 2: SADC Countries: Selected Economic Indicators 
Source: World Development Indicators, World Bank  
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Table 3: SADC Countries: Major Export Products 
 
Country Year  Exports  Share of  
Total Exports 
Angola 2003  Crude  oil  89,7 
     Diamonds  8,3 
     Refined petroleum products  1,4 
     Total 99,4 
Botswana 2005  Diamonds  72,0 
     Copper nickel  9,8 
     Textiles  4,7 
      Total 86,5 
Congo, Dem. Rep.  2004  Diamonds  45,7 
     Crude oil  19,9 
     Cobalt  13,8 
      Total 79,3 
Lesotho 2005  Clothing  65,4 
     Diamonds  15,4 
     Machinery  3,8 
      Total 84,7 
Madagascar 2004  Vanilla  46,3 
     Shellfish  18,6 
     Cloves  10,5 
      Total 75,4 
Malawi 2003  Tobacco  53,0 
     Tea  9,9 
     Sugar  9,1 
      Total 72,0 
Mauritius 2004  Sugar  85,8 
     Chemicals  3,3 
     Cut flowers   0,9 
     Total 90,0 
Mozambique 2004  Aluminum  60,8 
     Electricity  6,8 
     Prawns  6,1 
      Total 73,7 
Namibia 2004  Diamonds  45,2 
     Other manufactured products  16,0 
     Fish  9,8 
     Total 71,0 
South Africa  2006  Monetary gold  8,2 
     Bituminous coal  4,7 
     Platinum - unwrought or in powder form  4,2 
      Total 17,0 
Swaziland 2003  Edible  concentrates  55,1 
     Cottonseed and lint  15,9 
     Wood pulp  12,9 
      Total 83,8 
Tanzania 2004  Gold  49,6 
     Fish and Products  10,5 
      Total 60,1 
Zambia 2004  Copper  58,3 
     Nonmetal exports  25,7 
     Cobalt  16,0 
      Total 100,0 
Zimbabwe 2004  Gold  15,6 
     Tobacco  13,5 
     Ferrous alloys  11,0 
      Total 40,2 
      
Source: International Monetary Fund, Recent Economic Developments (various issues),  
National Statistical Office Malawi and data provided by the South African authorities. Table 4: SADC Countries: Country Exports as a Share of Total Exports (in per cent) 
From / To  Angola  Botswana 
Dem Rep 
of Congo  Lesotho                    Madagascar Malawi Mauritius Mozambique Namibia
South 








Angola                           N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A  N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A  N/A
Botswana                                    0.01 0.03 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.03 0.09 7.50 0.02 0.02 0.07 2.49 10.28 2.78
Dem Rep  
of Congo  N/A  N/A     N/A  N/A  N/A  N/A  N/A  N/A  N/A  N/A  N/A  N/A  N/A  N/A  N/A 
Lesotho                                N/A 0.10 N/A N/A 0.00 N/A N/A N/A 53.04 0.07 0.00 0.00 N/A 53.22 0.18
Madagascar                                    0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.43 0.02 0.00 1.00 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.01 2.51 1.51
Malawi                               0.01 0.20 0.03 0.13 0.16 0.01 2.29 0.03 22.19 0.02 0.95 2.11 3.18 31.32 9.13
Mauritius                                  0.13 0.01 0.00 0.05 4.77 0.00 0.05 0.01 2.15 0.01 0.06 0.04 0.07 7.34 5.19
Mozambique                                  0.06 0.02 0.13 0.03 0.01 1.04 0.04 0.00 14.10 0.35 0.19 0.09 3.20 19.26 5.16
Namibia                                 7.18 0.47 0.46 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.72 30.49 0.03 0.03 0.52 0.22 40.14 9.65
South Africa  1.31  N/A  0.69  N/A  0.14  0.47  0.54  1.73  N/A     N/A  0.76  2.19  2.03  9.87  9.87 
Swaziland                                   0.77 0.00 N/A 0.01 0.21 0.44 N/A 5.35 0.01 67.48 1.37 0.53 2.90 79.06 11.58
Tanzania                                  0.17 0.00 1.37 0.00 0.06 1.06 0.05 0.63 0.02 14.31 0.11 0.91 0.07 18.77 4.46
Zambia                                0.01 0.16 3.56 0.13 0.00 1.49 0.02 0.03 0.50 11.01 0.03 0.46 1.42 18.82 7.81
Zimbabwe                                    0.20 2.51 0.66 0.17 0.00 2.47 0.09 1.01 0.74 29.34 0.01 0.26 3.72 41.18 11.84
                                                 
Addendum item: euro area countries (2006) 
Intra-area exports in per cent of total 
exports 
Austria                        Belgium Finland France Germany Greece Ireland Italy Luxembourg Netherlands Portugal Spain
                          53 64 31 50 41 34 42 43 71 62 61 59
 
Sources: UN Comtrade Statistics and IMF Direction of Trade Statistics. 
Note: The data pertain to the latest year for which such data are available for each country - - i.e., either 2004, 2005, or 2006. 
 
  47Table 5: SADC Countries: Status of Macroeconomic Convergence  
Country  Inflation Rate 
Budget Deficit 






Current account balance 
as percentage 
of GDP 
Real Growth rate 
  2005    2006 2005  2006  2005  2006  2005  2006  2005  2006 
Angola  18.5    12.2 7.3  -3.4  37.8  25.5  15.7  16.4  20.6  19.5 
Botswana  8.6    11.6 1.2  8.1  4.4  3.8  15.7  20.9  9.2  -0.8 
Congo, Dem. Rep.  21.3    18.2 -1.2  -0.7  158.7  133.4  -4.4  -7.5  6.5  5.1 
Lesotho  3.5    6.0 2.0  13.3  50.3  49.9  -6.8  4.3  4.0  6.2 
Madagascar  18.4    10.8 -10.3  -10.3  87.0  30.0  -10.9  -8.8  4.6  4.9 
Malawi  15.4    13.9 -1.2  -1.5  105.4  28.5  -34.0  -31.2  2.3  8.5 
Mauritius  4.9    8.9 -5.0  -5.3  58.3  57.9  -5.2  -9.5  2.2  5.0 
Mozambique 
1 6.4    13.2 -3.5  -1.0  70.0  47.7  -11.09  -8.0  6.2  8.5 
Namibia  2.2    5.1 -1.1  2.1  33.6  31.4  7.1  18.3  4.2  4.6 
South Africa  3.9    4.6 -0.5  0.3
  36.6  33.3  -4.0  -6.5  5.1  5.0 
Swaziland  4.8    5.3 -1.8  -2.1  16.9  17.1  0.26  1.8  2.3  2.8 
Tanzania  4.4    6.2 5.0  -5.5  63.8  49.97  -6.9  -10.9  6.7  6.2 
Zambia  15.9    8.2 -2.6  -1.9  64.5  25.8  -11.8  -1.2  5.2  5.8 
Zimbabwe  585.8    1281.8 -3.5  -5.5  110.2  76.2  -12.0  -7.9  -3.8  -1.8 
Average, 
SADC excl Zimbabwe  9.9  9.6  -0.9  -0.6  60.6  41.1  -4.3  -1.7  6.1  6.3 
Average, 







than 5 per cent 
by 2008 
Less than 60 per cent 
of GDP 
 
Deficit not wider 
than 9 per cent 
of GDP 
Not less than 




1 2006 GDP is estimated 
 
  Source: Committee of Central Bank Governors of SADC (2007) 
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Traditional 1.  Estimated second-order autoregressions of per-capita 
growth. 
2.  Used residuals from autoregressions of per capita growth 
to calculate correlations of shocks across countries.  
Correlations tend to be positive but small and insignificant, 




1960-90  12 SADC  Traditional  Estimated three measures of convergence of real per capita 
incomes based on PPP exchange rates: (1) changes in the 
dispersion of cross-sectional income levels; (2) regressions 
of growth rates on initial levels of per-capita GDP; (3) 
probability-based approach 
Found no evidence of per-capita-income convergence among 
the 12 countries, suggesting that they are not suitable for 
monetary integration. Found that Botswana, Lesotho, 





1968-93  5; CMA plus Botswana  Endogenous 
(credibility) 
Compared political indicators of checks balances in 
government, and indicators of economic and political shocks 
(e.g., number of cabinet changes, changes in terms of trade). 
Obtained mixed results. Low-party fractionalization and low 
levels of constraint on executive branches indicated low cost 
of breaking rules - - unfavourable for monetary union. Exits 




1990-2000  5; CMA plus Botswana  Traditional  Tested for cointegration among real exchange rates.  Significant co-movement in real exchange rates indicated the 
existence of common trends so that underlying country-
specific shocks and/or policy changes do not lead to 
diverging relative prices. 
Carrere (2004)  1962-96  12 SADC  Endogenous 
(trade creation) 
Used gravity model, with bilateral nominal exchange-rate 
volatility employed as proxy for common-currency effect. 
Obtained inconclusive results. 
Dutu-Sparks 
(2004) 
1995-98  14 SADC  Traditional  Inspection of the degree of convergence of nominal bilateral 
exchange rates against the South African rand, inflation 
rates, and external debt-to-GDP ratios; also considered 
foreign aid and trade openness. 
The four-member CMA could gradually be expanded to 
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Traditional  Used residuals from autoregressive model to estimated 
unanticipated component of bilateral real exchange rates 
against South African rand. GARCH model used to consider 
the share of real-exchange rate variation explained by 
divergent macro policies. 
The 10 countries considered not suited for monetary union. 
An 8-member currency union, excluding Tanzania and 
Zambia, was judged suitable. 
Masson-Pattillo  
(2005) 







1.  Considered correlations of changes in terms of trade 
between country pairs. 
2.   Used calibrated model to simulate benefits and costs of 
monetary union. 
3.  Estimated gravity model to assess trade-creation effects. 
Generally supportive of gradual, selective path to monetary 
union. 
Yehoue (2005)  1980-2000  53, including  
14 SADC plus Seychelles 
Traditional 1.  Used model based on trade-network external ties under 
which currency blocks are formed endogenously.  
2.  Computed measures of lack of co-movement in output 
levels. 
Generally supportive of gradual path to common currency. 
Trade-network model supported monetary union of 23 
countries, including all 14 SADC countries; Estimates based 
on lack of output co-movements supported 9-member SADC 
monetary union. 






6 other eastern African 
countries 
Traditional  Applied cluster analysis to  
(1) correlations of demand and supply shocks, (2) trade 
intensity, (3) debt service ratio, (4) public debt ratio, (5) tax 
revenue ratio, (6) inflation rate. 
Optimum cluster supported monetary union comprised of 
Botswana, Namibia, Seychelles, South Africa, and 
Swaziland.  
Masson (2006)  1995-2000  14 SADC  Endogenous Extended  Masson-Pattillo  calibration model to include 
endogenous trade-creation effects. 
Under symmetric monetary union, costs of union exceeded 
benefits for 4 CMA countries. Most other countries were net 
gainers. 
Buigut-Valev (2006)  1970-2002  21; 14 SADC; 
7 other eastern African 
countries 
Traditional  Studied correlation of demand and supply shocks. Shocks 
were decomposed using Blanchard-Quah technique. 
Correlations suggest monetary union of the 4 CMA countries 
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Wang, Masha, Shirono, 
Harris (2006) 
1980-2005  5; CMA plus Botswana  Traditional  Used Bayoumi-Ostry (1997) approach to extract shocks from 
per capita GDP. Calculated correlations of the shocks. 
 
Shocks were found to be asymmetric (4 of 6 correlations 
were negative). 
Jefferis (2007)  1990-2002  13 SADC (excluding 
Madagascar) 
Traditional  Examined correlation of bilateral exchange-rate changes 
against the South African rand. 
Based on bilateral exchange-rate changes, as well as 
inflation and interest-rate differentials against South Africa, 
identified a “convergence group” of countries comprised of 
Botswana, Lesotho, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, 
South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania. 
Karras (2007)  1960-2000 
(IFS) 
1980-2000 
(Penn World Tables) 





Traditional  Extracted cyclical movements of both PPP-adjusted GDP 
and GDP valued at market exchange rates using filters. 
Examined cyclical correlations. 
Correlations suggest monetary union of Malawi, 
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